Financial services & fintech
Teams whose AI touches money – invoices, payouts, refunds, transfers.
Payment agents and invoice automation act on money. The failure modes are fraud-shaped, and they hide in a single tool argument.
An injected invoice swaps the payee’s bank details
The account number must appear in something the agent actually read, or the payment doesn’t go out.
A transfer over the limit, or with nobody signing off
Amount limits on payment tools, and payments can wait for a person to approve them.
Paying before the vendor has been checked
An order rule – “pay only after the vendor lookup” – is enforced across the whole run.
Card and account numbers leaving through a tool call
Data in/guard/out masked is blocked from leaving in tool arguments.
A run that loops and runs up cost
Per-run caps on cost, steps and tool calls stop it before the next model call.
The invoice that changed its bank details
A supplier emails a PDF invoice. Hidden inside it is a line written for the AI rather than for you: pay this other account instead. The assistant reads the invoice, believes the hidden line, and files a payment for a real amount to a stranger’s account. Nobody sees a mistake, because there isn’t one to see – every field looks normal.
in/guard/out checks the account number and the amount against the documents the AI actually read. An account that appears nowhere never gets paid, and payments can wait for a person to say yes.